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Conflict of Laws--A Rationale of
Jurisdiction--Service of Process
By Roy MORELAND*
Editor's Note: This is the fourth and final installment of a study and
series of articles on Jurisdiction in the field of Conflict of Laws.
The first installment appeared in 54 Ky. L.J. 5 (1965) and dis-
cussed, among other things, "Presence" as a basis of jurisdiction.
The second installment appeared in 54 Ky. L.J. 171 (1966) and
discussed "Domicile," "Nationality," "Appearance," and "Con-
sent" as bases of jurisdiction. The third installment appeared in
55 Ky. L.J. 11 (1966) and discussed "Doing of an Act" as a
basis of jurisdiction. The concluding installment discusses "Service
of Process," which is also a problem of jurisdiction as a facet of
the Constitutional requirement of due process.
VII. SERVICE OF PROCESS
While the primary concern here is the problem of service on
an out-of-state defendant, it is thought advisable to discuss it first
on the state level, i.e., service of process where the defendant is
within the state. It is hoped that a determination of what is
reasonable and adequate on the state level will be helpful in
determining what is sufficient where the defendant is not present
in the state. One might deduce that the rules should coincide and
merge on the two levels, subject perhaps to some variance in the
two categories because of practical differences in the circumstances.
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN SUITS BETWEEN LITIGANTS PRESENT
WITHIN THE STATE.
1. Personal Service-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (4) (d)
(1) [hereinafter cited as CR] provides that a copy of the summons
and complaint be personally served on the defendant, and be left
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of
O Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL. B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J. D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity Law School.
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suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or delivered to
an agent.167 It would appear that this rule is reasonable and in
accordance with the standards of "fair play" required in judicial
procedure. The question is whether the rule should go further.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 (c) (3) takes this additional
step by providing that the defendant may be served personally
or by mailing the warrant to his last known address, an alternative
which is omitted in the new Kentucky Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure 2.10 (2). It is submitted that the Federal Civil Rule and
the Kentucky Criminal Rule, which omit mail service to the
last known address, are more in accordance with reasonable and
fair constitutional process. That question, among others, how-
ever, is grist for discussions ahead where it may be found that some
sort of service by mail is both desirable and constitutional, so
long as the defendant receives actual notice.
Personal service on the defendant is in the historic tradition.
As pointed out by Professor Blume,168 the service could not be
accomplished unless the server and the defendant were so situated
that the defendant could be arrested. This early concept of
jurisdiction and service was carried forward and served as a basis
for statements such as Holmes' that the foundation of juris-
diction is physical power over the defendant.169 Pennoyer v. Neff'rO
enunciated the same fundamental idea when it held that a de-
fendant could not be brought within the jurisdiction of the court
except by personal service within the state. But the physical power
concept of early history, of Holmes, and of Pennoyer has been in-
creasingly eroded because social needs and an expanding con-
ception of due process have so required .The first big break in the
dike of "physical power" occurred in Hess v. Pawloski, 171 where
the Supreme Court upheld out-of-state service on a non-resident
who had an automobile accident within the forum state. Further
inroads have been made on the concept, and there will be more.
Discussions earlier in this series have shown how the historic
conception of physical power as a basis of jurisdiction has led to
the sometimes shocking rule that jurisdiction over a transient may
16 7 Many states have adopted the same or practically the same rule. See,
e.g., Ky. R. Crv. P. 4.04 [hereinafter cited as CR].
168W. BLUME, AMammICAN CIVI PROCEDUE 276 (1955).
169 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
17095 U.S. 714 (1878).
171274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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be obtained by serving him while he is temporarily and casually
within the state.172 Conversely, the "power concept" has also led
to increased difficulty in apprehending the elusive defendant who
finds a haven from local suit by hiding or fleeing to another state.
2. Substituted Personal Service173-The traditional manner of
substituted service is to leave the summons at the defendant's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suit-
able age and discretion then residing therein, as provided in CR
4 (d) (1). This is ordinarily as satisfactory as personal service since
the defendant will usually get the summons. In case he does not
actually receive it, the law should provide him recourse so that
he would not have to suffer a default judgment. Lack of such re-
course would not be "fair play," but if the statute is literally in-
terpreted, 174 no relief is provided. This lack of "fair play" amounts
to a historic survivor which the law has not, as yet, corrected. 7 5
In such a case the courts will say that the service is good "if it was
reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice .. ."176
This rather glib statement is little consolation to a defendant who
had no actual notice of the suit and suffered a default judgment.
172 See Moreland, Conflict of Laws-A Rationale of Jurisdiction, 54 Ky.
L.J. 5, 10-18 (1965).
173The phrase "substituted personal service" is somewhat unfortunate. How-
ever, it is inveterate in statutes, cases, and texts and it is difficult to phrase a
better one. See, e.g., F. JAmEs, CIVIL PROcEDunE 622 (1965).
174 Bryant v. Shute's Ex'r, 147 Ky. 268, 144 S.W. 28 (1912).
It must of course follow that if the statute is followed in the matter of
making the service by leaving a copy at the residence of the de-
fendant the fact that the defendant did not receive actual notice, or
that actual notice of the action was not thereby brought to him, does
not affect the validity of the judgment. If it were allowed to do so such
process would be of no effect, and it would have been useless to pre-
scribe it. Id. at 276, 144 S.V. at 32.
175 RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF =ra CONFLICOr OF Laws § 75(e) (1956)
states: "It is not necessary that the defendant should have received actual know-
ledge of the action." Moreover, "for a defendant domiciled in the state, service
of the summons by leaving it at his last and usual place of abode is enough."
Id. at § 75(d). These statements are tempered somewhat by the Supreme Court's
observation in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950), that: "The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." For various
wordings of state statutes and cases pro and con, see 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcncE § 4.11(3) (2d ed. 1965). See also FE. R. Cirv. P. 60(b) for possible
relief from default judgment where no notice was received.
176 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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Kentucky, in a rare departure, has evaded the occasional
inequities in the rule by omitting the alternative provision for
service at the defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein.
The only service provided by the Kentucky Rule is personal
service.177 While this is eminently more fair to the defendant, it
often puts a difficult burden on process servers since they some-
times have to return many times, often at night, to effect service,
and occasionally the defendant is never served.
The question naturally arises: Why not use the registered
letter with return receipt as one alternative for obtaining personal
service on the elusive defendant? It is arguable that the part of the
rule which permits leaving the summons at the defendant's dwell-
ing should not result in a valid service unless the defendant re-
ceives actual notice. However, the mailing of a registered letter
with return receipt would give the defendant actual notice or he
would not be validly served. This method of service is quite com-
mon with out-of-state service, such as in an automobile accident
case. 178 There would seem to be no reason why it could not be
used advantageously to serve in-state defendants.
Admittedly, service by mail would not reach all elusive de-
fendants. Perhaps it is better to let the scales weigh, as they do at
present, in favor of the plaintiff in such cases. That may not result
completely in fair play, but it may be good public policy which, in
the end, may outweigh the ideal of notice in all cases. However,
that decision should be a matter of considered determination.
Actually, the use of service by mail is provided by statute in
some states. An illustrative decision is Durfee v. Durfee,179 a Mass-
achusetts case. The statute provided that "when personal service
is required of any citation issued by a probate court, the court may
direct such service to be made by registered mail addressed to the
party entitled thereto at his post office address." Not only was the
citation delivered by registered mail, but a return receipt, which
the defendant signed, was attached. The court correctly held that
the service was valid. Of course, service by mail should always
provide for a registered letter with return receipt to insure actual
177CR 4.04(1).
178See, e.g., Ky. BEv. STAT. ch. 188 (1962).
179 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936). See N.Y. Jui. C. REPORT AND
STDmiES 183 (1938).
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notice and return thereof to the court. However, several juris-
dictions have provided that ordinary mail is sufficient in certain
cases.' 80 It has been said that service by ordinary mail should be
valid even though not received, in view of a presumption that mail
properly addressed and stamped is delivered.'8 ' But, in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Wuchter v. Pizzuti s 2 and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 8 3 the statement
is of doubtful validity. There is no good reason to resort to
ordinary mail when the registered letter with return receipt is
available.
3. Service to an agent-It is trite to say that service may be
made upon an agent authorized to accept it. But when the agent
is not authorized to accept service, or the suit does not arise out of
the subject of agency, more difficult questions are presented. In
such cases, the law of agency and corporations may well govern. As
pointed out by Professor James,'14 the very fact of agency raises a
likelihood that notice will be given, even though no authority is
given to accept service and it is not authorized by statute.ls 5
4. Service in actions in rem-In an in rem action, service by
newspaper publication that the owner of the property might or
might not see has been valid for several hundred years. There is
authority as early as 1668 to the effect that the plaintiff in an in
rem action was "not bound to give the owner notice of the sum-
mons."' This astonishing rule, when viewed in the light of cur-
rent mores, arose out of the fact that in those days owners or ten-
ants of land lived on the land and would watch for suits concerning
it. Presumably, they would see a notice of a suit when published
in the local newspaper. It was largely a rural society, population
was sparse, and people, especially the owners of land, did not move
around much. Even under those conditions, the rule must have
worked many inequities, and it is even more unfair under modem
180 See 4 N.Y. Jun. C. REPORT AND STUDIES 198 n. 30 (1988) for illustrative
statutes.
181 F. JA ES, supra note 173, at 652.
182 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
183 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
184 F. JAsiss, supra note 173, at 650.
18 5 For abstracts of numerous cases illustrative of various problems in the
relationships of agency and service of process, see 2 J. MooRE, supra note 175, at
1 4.12.
'80 NV. BLmms, supra note 168. at 180.
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conditions. Many people do not live on their land now, population
is often dense, and legal notices are seldom read. Service by
publication has outlived its efficiency, but like so many other types
of service of process, it has lingered on because the law was un-
able to keep up with a changing society and advancing notions of
"fair play." However, as in some other categories of service of
process, an attack is now on as to service by publication in an in
rem action. Representative is the excellent opinion in 1950 by
Mr. Justice Jackson in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &c Trust
Company.8s The case tore a large hole in the dyke of service by
publication. That case and the problem will be considered later
in the discussion of service of process by publication on out-of-
state defendants.
Fortunately, Mullane has already borne fruit as to service by
publication on in-state defendants. In Walker v. Hutchinson, ls
the Supreme Court held that service by publication in a land
condemnation suit was insufficient where the owner had no actual
knowledge of the suit. The Court stated that Mullane had given
thorough consideration to the problem of adequate notice under
the due process clause, saying: "It is common knowledge that
mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of pro-
ceedings against his property."'
18 9
B. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
1. Personal service on nonresidents within the forum state-
One of the historic bases of jurisdiction over nonresidents is pre-
sence in the forum state. If a resident of Ohio is physically present
in Kentucky, he may be served in a Kentucky suit while he is
actually in the state, even though his presence is only temporary
and casual. Except for the rare application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the basis of jurisdiction and service of
process are valid in such a case, and the judgment in the suit is
entitled to full faith and credit in any other state. This somewhat
astounding situation is the result of an application of the "power
concept" of jurisdiction and service.
187 339 U.S. 806 (1950).
188 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
189 Id. at 116.
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The "power concept" is of ancient heritage. As stated earlier,
people in early England lived in sparsely settled communities and
did not move around very much. Suits in those early days were
begun by arresting the defendant.190 Thus, the "power concept"
developed. There is nothing very astonishing about this early
rationalization; it fitted a situation where the parties to suits and
their causes of action were local. As time passed, the rule and the
rationalization continued, and well they might, for what better
justification might a court have for subjecting a defendant to a
suit than that he was physically within the court's jurisdiction and
power-power not only to try the case but to make an effective de-
cree. So, even today, there is nothing astounding about a court
having jurisdiction to try.a case where the subject matter and the
parties are before the court.
But the "power concept" of jurisdiction and service raises two
important problems under modem conditions. In the past, few
parties from other jurisdictions came within the local jurisdiction,
but today numerous "foreign" defendants come in, sometimes
temporarily. Often it is desirable to sue such transients locally,
e.g., the plaintiff may be a resident of the forum state or an elusive
defendant may be advantageously "found" there.
The other current problem occurs where the plaintiff desires
to sue in the forum state but the defendant is a nonresident of
that jurisdiction. The plaintiff could follow the defendant and
sue him in the state where he is domiciled or residing, but in many
situations this may not be the best solution to the problem. Under
certain conditions, should he be able to sue the nonresident
locally? These two problems will now be considered separately.
The first problem, that of serving the non-resident who is
temporarily and casually within the forum state, is not really a
conflict-of-laws problem. The plaintiff and the defendant are both
''present" in the jurisdiction and the defendant is served therein.
Nevertheless, the defendant is, in fact, a non-resident. Technically,
there is no conflicts question; the defendant is a transient and, as
such, a resident of another state.
The problem of the transient defendant who is served while
temporarily within the forum state has been discussed at con-
190 W. BLUmE, supra note 168, at 274.
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siderable length elsewhere in this series of articles, 191 and no
attempt will be made to consider it anew at this point. Realistically,
the rule has its advantages and disadvantages. If the plaintiff is a
resident of the forum state there is an advantage to him in being
able to sue the non-resident therein, rather than in the jurisdiction
in which the transient is domiciled or a resident. Furthermore, if
the defendant is elusive the plaintiff can sue and serve him in any
jurisdiction in which he is temporarily present. Thus, the rule
results in a considerable check on elusive or mobile defendants.
These are good results, and they stem, of course, from the "power
concept" of jurisdiction and service.
However, the "power concept" has its disadvantages. Often the
defendant is forced to defend a suit in a state with no connection
to the case, except that he was served while temporarily present
therein. Peabody v. Hamilton9 2 involved a defendant who had
no connection with the forum state other than that he was served
while his boat was temporarily anchored there. Peabody upheld
jurisdiction in spite of the state's limited connection with the
case.19
3
The law of transient jurisdiction is under vigorous attack. 94
But, it is submitted, the attackers are only partly right. Such
service does have its disadvantages; it also has its advantages. It
has historical roots, and it would seem fair to allow the elusive
defendant to be sued wherever he can be "caught." Its inequities
should be ironed out. Then the rule as to jurisdiction, based upon
presence in the forum state, might well read, as suggested earlier
in this study of jurisdictional problems, as follows:
A state has jurisdiction over an individual who is present
within its territory whether permanently or temporarily pro-
vided that, balancing the interests of the parties,195 it appears
that there has been sufficient contact with the state to justify
a suit therein, or the defendant is so elusive that it would be
difficult to find him in a state which would have jurisdiction of
191 See Moreland, supra note 172, at 15.
192 108 Mass. 217 (1870).
193 See also Darnah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872).
'94 See, e.g., Transient Jurisdiction-Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff, A Round
Table Discussion, 9 J. PUB. LAw 281-387 (1960).
19 5 See G. STummmEG, PHiNCniLES OF THm CoNFLicT OF LAWS 68 (3d ed.
1963).
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the case under ordinary, more acceptable principles.'96
2. Service on foreign corporations doing business within the
state-As discussed elsewhere in this series of articles, 97 jurisdiction
over foreign corporations has evolved in three steps. The first ap-
proach to the foreign corporation problem was grounded on the
proposition that the forum could keep the foreign corporation
out; consequently, it could put conditions upon letting it come
in. Such conditions could include provisions as to service of pro-
cess. This approach has been largely repudiated, but many statutes
still provide for local service. The second approach was based upon
the theory that if a foreign corporation did enough "business" in
the forum to justify suing it there the state had jurisdiction. This
type of statute is still widely used. The third, and more recently
used approach, is based upon the theory that if the foreign corpora-
tion does isolated acts--or even one substantial single act-in the
forum, it is subject to local jurisdiction.
As in actions in personam, due process in corporation cases
is concerned not only with jurisdiction, under one of the above
approaches, but also with service of process. There has been con-
siderable evolution in ideas as to the sufficiency of service in
corporate cases. Early statutes provided that foreign corporations
desiring to do business in a state should appoint an agent therein
for service of process, especially if the corporation planned to
maintain no business office in the state. But corporations often
did not take the affirmative step of appointing an agent for service
of process. So these statutes provided further that if no agent for
process was appointed, service might be made upon the forum's
Secretary of State. Is such a statute constitutional as to sufficiency
of service under due process? Professor Stumberg states that it is
"if proper steps have been taken to notify the corporation of the
pendency of the suit.""' This ordinarily means that the Secre-
tary of State should send the foreign corporation a registered letter
with return receipt. Such statutes are now common. Some cases
say that only the best service, if short of actual notice, should suf-
fice. In view of realistic thinking by the present Supreme Court, it
would seem that, except for rare cases where circumstances might
196 Moreland, Conflict of Laws-A Rationale of Jurisdiction, 54 Ky. L. J. 5,
17 (1965).
197 Id. at 12-16, 23-28.
198G. St-mm~anc, supra note 195, at 84.
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warrant less, the registered letter with return receipt would seem
to be required. The Supreme Court is moving strongly and quickly
to a view that due process requires actual notice in practically all
cases. 19
3. Service on private persons outside the jurisdiction-As pre-
viously stated,200 the "power concept" of jurisdiction and service
of process raises two important problems under current condi-
tions. The first problem concerns the transient defendant who
becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the forum because he was
served there while temporarily present.
The other problem occurs when the plaintiff desires to sue in
the forum state but the defendant is a non-resident of that
jurisdiction. In these cases, the related questions of jurisdiction
and service of process are involved. As discussed, in earlier days
suits were largely between local litigants and concerned local in-
juries. Consequently, it was natural that there grew up a civil
process based upon "physical power" over the parties and subject
matter. If the parties were present and the adjudication involved
a local controversy, the court had "power" to try the case and
render an effective decree. Service of process was effected by
"arresting" the defendant to make him available for the trial.
However, as time passed, the "power concept" proved too nar-
row to meet the demands of an advancing and changing society.
Many suits were no longer local; it was often necessary to sue out-
of-state defendants and to be able to serve them so that they could
be brought before the court. Such problems were inevitable in
intercourse with other jurisdictions. Thus, it became necessary to
add additional theories of jurisdiction and service to the original
"power concept." Such additions and changes in judicial concepts
were reluctantly made, for the law was, and is, slow to adapt to
society's changes.
The first big break in the "physical power" concept occurred in
1927 in the historic case of Hess v. Pawloski.20' Two things were
perhaps most responsible for delaying this evolutionary change.
The first was the oft repeated statement of Justice Holmes that
199 Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), and Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) are representative of the current
trend. See also ILL. STAT. Aim. ch. 32, § 157.109-.111 (1954).
2o See text at notes 190-93 supra.
201274 U.S. 852 (1927).
[Vol. 56,
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"the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." 20 2 That state-
ment was historically correct, and Holmes' prestige added much
to the continued acceptance of the "physical power" concept.
The other stumbling block was the decision in Pennoyer v.
Neff. 20 3 Professor Ehrenzweig has stated that the decision was
historically incorrect and socially unsound.20 4 While both of these
observations are overstatements, it can be said that the decision's
language was reactionary. Hess v. Pawloski and its successors
justify this statement although Pawloski was not decided until
fifty years after Pennoyer. A similar decision should have come
much earlier. Pennoyer involved an action in personam against
a non-resident who was served by publication. The situation
presented a fine opportunity to render a landmark decision
that service by publication was insufficient for in personam
jurisdiction over non-residents. Indeed, that was the specific point
before the Court.20 5 The Court met the problem by deciding that
it was insufficient: "But where the entire object of the action is to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants,
that is where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service in
this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose."
20 6
That was a correct decision on the specific point before the Court.
Unfortunately, however, the decision went much further. For
example, the Court said: "Process from the tribunals of one State
cannot run into another State and summon parties there domiciled
to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them.2 07
What this probably meant was that such could not be done under
Pennoyer's facts, but, at best, the statement is misleading. Ad-
mitting that the case was decided correctly on its facts, some of the
language is unfortunate and the case has had a reactionary effect
on the development of jurisdiction and service in action in per-
sonam where the defendant is a non-resident.
Hess v. Pawloski, which broke the "power concept" deadlock
as to jurisdiction and service on non-residents by creating an
2 02 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
203 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
204 Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
205 Other matters before the Court depended upon the disposition of this
point.
206 95 U.S. at 727.
207 Id.
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exception to the narrowness of the existing rule, opened a whole
Pandora's box of new situations where jurisdiction might be ob-
tained over non-residents. These situations are presently limited
to non-residents who have done "acts" within the forum state.
At first, these "acts" had to come within the police power con-
cept, but this new basis of jurisdiction is now being extended to
any kind of substantial act involving tort or contract. It may be
prophesied that the "power concept" of jurisdiction over non-
residents, who are served while temporarily within the state, will
also continue to serve as a basis of jurisdiction over non-residents,
although refined somewhat to adjust the principle to the standards
of "fair play." So today, the "power concept" is only one of
several jurisdictional principles applicable to non-residents. Domi-
cile and citizenship, for example, are also old, established bases.
The reactionary influence of the "power concept" and Pennoyer
has been largely eliminated.
The Court, in Hess v. Paw loski, while creating a revolutionary
exception to the 'power concept," uttered some very reactionary
language:
The process of a court of one State cannot run into another
and summon a party there domiciled to respond to pro-
ceedings against him. Notice sent outside the State to a non-
resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against
him personally for money recovery. There must be actual ser-
vice within the State of notice upon him or upon someone
authorized to accept service for him.20 s (Emphasis added.)
The Court then proceeded to permit jurisdiction and service by
registered mail with return receipt outside the state as authorized
under the state statute. The last half of the opinion is so contra-
dictory to the first half that it seems impossible that it was written
by the same judge. However, one should not be too servere on a
transitional opinion.
The case permits service by registered letter with return re-
ceipt. Assuming there is a basis of jurisdiction, this is now uni-
formly held to constitute due process in actions in personam
against a non-resident. This is sufficient actual notice.
Is service on the Secretary of State of the forum state sufficient?
208274 U.S. 352, 855 (1927).
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Since Wuchter v. Pizzutti,20 9 and the principles of fair play
enunciated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co.,2 10 this probably would not be valid service. In Wuchter, the
plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, was injured by a car driven by
the defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania. The defendant was
served by leaving a copy of the summons with the New Jersey
Secretary of State, as provided by a statute which made him the
agent for service of process on a non-resident who used the high-
ways. Receiving no notice, the defendant suffered a default judg-
ment. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional be-
cause it contained no provision making it reasonably probable
that the defendant would receive actual notice.21'
As to whether a requirement that a forwarding of notice of
service of process by the state official will be implied in the absence
of statutory direction, it is impossible to speak with absoluteness.
In a corporation case,2 1 2 where the statute itself required no such
forwarding, a state court correctly said that such forwarding of
notice will be implied. Courts consistently say that "due process
requires a method of notice reasonably calculated to afford parties
interested in a judicial proceeding the opportunity to appear and
be heard."213 But this is weasel language going back far beyond
Pizzutti and Mullane. The phrase "reasonably calculated to reach"
does not require "actual notice." It is used repeatedly in cases
where jurisdiction is based on domicile but the defendant is out-
side the state. In Milliken v. Meyer,214 Justice Douglas uttered the
phrase, and in a similar situation where the defendant was out of
the state but retained a forum domicile, Justice Holmes said that
perhaps a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would
be sufficient.21
An ordinary letter mailed to the defendant's last known ad-
dress outside the state would be due process, if he actually re-
ceived it. If he did not receive it and suffered a default judgment,
the matter is questionable, although Professor James thinks that
209 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
210 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
211 276 U.S. at 19.212 Mazzoleni v. Transamerica Corp., 313 Pa. 317, 169 A. 127 (1933).
213 Developments in the Law-Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 909, 987
(1960).
214 311 U.S. 457 (1940).215 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
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such service is sufficient in view of the "presumption that a letter
properly addressed, stamped and posted was in fact delivered. 216
One case has held such service valid.217 The presumption may be
questioned in view of current mail service, but the situation
probably falls within the "reasonably calculated to reach" test.
The current trend, in view of Pizzutti and Mullane, is toward a
requirement of actual notice to satisfy due process, except in
rare cases. However, the phrase "reasonably calculated to reach"
undoubtedly still remains in the law, although the limits of the
rule are currently impossible to draw because the question of
requisite notice is in transition. Ideally, the rule undoubtedly
would be: Anything less than actual notice is insufficient.
4. Out of state service in actions in rem-The Restatement
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws has this Comment as to notice in
actions in rem:
Requirement of Notice. Whether a particular method of noti-
fication is reasonable, and hence sufficient, depends upon
the nature of the action and upon the circumstances. A
method may suffice in proceedings in rem and Quasi in rem
and yet not be adequate in a proceeding in personam.
Generally speaking, the requirements as to notice are more
stringent where the purpose of the action is to obtain a
personal judgment against the defendant than where the pur-
pose is to obtain a judgment affecting the defendant's in-
terests in a thing.218
This statement represents the dated, reactionary view as to notice
in actions in rem. The Restatement continues in language point-
ing up the severity of the situation:
Where the adverse claimants are unknown, notification by
publication in a newspaper or by posting a notice at the court-
house or on the premises involved, will ordinarily be suf-
ficient. Where, however, the proceeding will affect the
interests of known claimants, a form of notification better
calculated to reach them, if available, may be necessary. Such
notification may be by mail, by personal service even out-
side the state, or otherwise. 19
2 16 F. JAums, supra note 173, at 652.
217 Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936). See 4 N.Y.
JuD. C. REPORT AN STuDis 183 (1938).21 8
1x$TATEmENT (SEcoND) OF THE CoNFLIcT ov LAWS § 100, comment
c (1957).
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These Comments represent a literal statement of existing law
as to service of process against non-resident defendants in actions
in rem, even after Mullane. They indicate the onesided, reaction-
ary condition of the present situation. Part of the problem is due
to the fact that the rules governing service in actions in rem are
historic survivors. They date back to the times when those with
interests in land lived on the land, and would supposedly know of
claims against it. Another part of the problem perhaps goes back
to the fact that a scarcity in land is developing and rules as to
service and land proceedings will undoubtedly tighten up. At any
rate, the actual decision and the language in the Mullane opinion
were long overdue. The decision was almost as revolutionary as
Hess v. Pawloski. Accepting most of what has gone before as im-
portant only as history, the modem law of sufficiency of service in
actions in rem may be said to begin with Mullane, both as to actual
decision and dictum as to the problem. It therefore becomes im-
portant to examine Mullane with particularity.
Mullane was an in rem proceeding to determine, among other
things, the sufficiency of notice to the beneficiaries of a trust
fund. The beneficiaries lived outside the forum state, Florida. The
Supreme Court held that service by publication was sufficient
notice to those whose addresses were unknown, but insufficient as
to those with known addresses. Notice by publication was in strict
accordance with a Florida statute. The net result of the decision
was to hold the statute unconstitutional as to those whose addresses
were known. Should it have been unconstitutional also as to those
whose addresses were unknown? That question has not been
answered affirmatively as yet, but such an answer may well come
in the near future.
The Court had difficulty in determining whether the action
was really in rem or in personam. This provided an opportunity
to say that sufficiency of service should not be determined upon
the technicality of the nature of the action but, instead, upon the
reasonableness of the service under the circumstances. This ap-
parent truism was a revolutionary statement in view of the historic
differences of notice in actions in personam and in rem. The rule
of the case that sufficiency should be based upon reasonableness,
not classification, will often lead to differences in the service re-
quired in actions in personam and in rem, as in Mullane, but it
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is a movement towards frankly facing the problem and tightening
the rule as to sufficiency of notice in actions in rem.
The opinion says that service by publication will only reach
non-residents whose addresses are unknown by chance, but the
case holds that such service is reasonable. And yet the opinion
is forward looking in that it removes the historic division between
actions in rem and in personam as to sufficiency of service. Also, an
advanced step is made with the observation that service by publi-
cation is unreasonable as to non-residents whose addresses are
known. The law had been otherwise for several hundred years.
The case will do much towards advancing the standards of fair
play as to service in actions in rem.
It may be concluded that constructive service in actions in
rem, as well as in personam, is under severe attack. Too long the
law has hidden ambiguity and indefiniteness behind vague words
and phrases of art like "constructive," "presumed," and "implied."
Recently, there has been a dramatic turn toward certainty in the
articulation of the law, and it should be no different with "con-
structive service." Instead of speaking of "constructive service"
in civil actions, let the courts say "service by publication," for
example. Instead of speaking of "service reasonably calculated to
reach," let the courts say "service by letter to the defendant's last
known address." If the courts, in referring to these historic
survivors, will speak specifically instead of in terms of art, it will be-
come apparent just how devoid of fair play the service actually is.
Vague words and phrases of art do no more than hide ambiguity.
As stated, the Comment in the Restatement quoted supra, 2o
represents a literal statement of existing law, even after Mullane,
as to service of process against non-resident defendants in actions
in rem. Mullane was a landmark case but the question still re-
mains: Was the decision correct as to service by publication upon
defendants whose addresses were unknown? Professor Goodrich
points out that after Mullane "the standard of reasonable notice
is the same for both actions in rem and in personam but the
measure of reasonableness may vary with the circumstances."21
(Emphasis added.) The writer accepts this as a proper interpreta-
tion of Mullane, but it is a rather glib statement because of the
220 Id.221 H. GooDmca, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 107 (4th ed. 1964).
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continued difference in result as to service of process between
actions in rem and in personam. If a non-resident cannot be
reached, it is submitted that the reasonableness of the situation is
the same whether the action is in rem or in personam. Does the
decision in Mullane, that service by publication on non-resident
defendants whose addresses are unknown is sufficient, represent
reasonableness under the circumstances? Default judgments where
there was no actual notice to the defendant are deplorable. The
law is in transition toward a further tightening up on service of
process. Actual notice in all cases may become a requisite of due
process in the not too distant future.
5. Service on out of state corporations-Assuming there is a
basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, 222 the next ques-
tion to be considered by a court is the matter of sufficient service
of process to satisfy due process. Historically, when it was
rationalized that a state could keep a foreign corporation out, and
thus could impose conditions on its admission, a usual condition
was that the out-of-state corporation appoint a local agent for
service of process. But sometimes the corporation failed to appoint
an agent and then left the state with outstanding claims. This led
to enabling statutes in the various states providing that if no agent
was appointed, or the agency had ended, service of process could
be made on the forum's Secretary of State or some other state
official.223 Sometimes this service would be forwarded to the home
office of the foreign corporation; sometimes it would not.
Decisions were uncertain as to whether service on the state
official was, in itself, sufficient without a forwarding. The matter
was brought to a head in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,224 the leading case
involving service on a non-resident by serving the forum's Secre-
tary of State. There, the Supreme Court considered a state
statute which provided that in actions by residents of the state
against non-residents for personal injuries resulting from the
operation of motor vehicles on the state highway, service of pro-
cess could be made on the Secretary of State as their agent. The
statute did not require process to be forwarded to the non-
resident. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated due
222 Moreland, supra note 196, at 12-16, 23-28.
223G. STUMwERG, supra note 195, at 84.
224276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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process since it made no provision making it reasonably probable
that notice of the service would be communicated to the de-
fendant. The defendant in Wuchter did, in fact, have actual
notice, but he did not appear.
It is submitted that this decision, involving a non-resident
private person, is equally applicable to a foreign corporation, and
represents a decided advance as to service of process on the forum
Secretary of State as to both classes of defendants.
Today, typical statutes provide for service on the local agent, or
if none was appointed or the agency has ended, then on the
Secretary of State or some other state official who shall forward
it to the home office of the foreign corporation.225 An affirmative
duty to forward the process is placed on the Secretary of State.
If this duty to forward is not written into the statute, will it be
implied? Mazzoleni v. Transamerica Corporation228 correctly gave
an affirmative answer to that question. Otherwise, the provision for
service would be unconstitutional on the authority of Wuchter.
Direct service by mail is often used as a means of giving
notice to a non-resident. Service by ordinary mail is occasionally
given approval. 27 It is often used in divorce actions against a non-
resident spouse which, of course, are actions in rem. Ordinarily, a
letter is sent to "his last known address." There is usually little
concern as to whether the letter is received. An authority has said
that ordinary mail is so reliable that service by such a notice is
presumptively received 22 But the last known address of the de-
fendant may not be his current address, and courts have been
careless about this fact.
In justifying service by ordinary mail, Professor James states
that "the constitution does not require receipt of notice in all
225 See, e.g., Illinois Business Corp. Act, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.111
(1954). This section provides:
In the event that any process, notice, or demand is served on the Secretary
of State, he shall immediately cause a copy thereof to be forwarded by
mail, addressed to such corporation at its plincipal office as the same
name appears in the records of the Secretary of State. Any service so
had on the Secretary of State shall be returnable in not less than thirty
days.
226313 Pa. 317, 169 A. 127 (1933).
227 See F. James, supra note 173, at 652. See also Durfee v. Durfee, 293
Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).2 2
8F. JAmEs, supra note 173, at 652.
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cases, but simply means reasonably calculated to give it."229 This
is an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution, which requires
"due process." The trouble is that courts have traditionally held
that "service reasonably calculated to reach" satisfies due pro-
cess. 230 However, this criterion is presently being re-examined,
and is under severe criticism. Constructive service ending in a
default judgment should be avoided where at all possible. The
requirements as to sufficiency of service have been entirely too
loose and the law is tending toward a requirement of actual service
in all cases.
This would seem to be particularly true of service on foreign
corporations. The foreign corporation's address can be obtained
from the proper official of the foreign state. Corporations, in all
states, record this information. Armed with the corporation's ad-
dress, the one attempting the service should be able to deliver
actual notice. A registered letter with return receipt will insure
that this has been done. Thus, anything less than actual service
should be insufficient notice and lack of due process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is concluded, therefore, that anything less than actual notice
to a foreign corporation should be lack of due process. It is more
difficult to lay down a suggested rule as to service on non-resident
private persons. Service on the forum Secretary of State or other
forum official without a forwarding is insufficient under Pizzutti.
It is, however, still the prevailing rule that service "reasonably
calculated to reach" a non-resident does not violate due process.
This historic rule is under attack, although given reiteration in
the Restatement of Judgments and the Restatement (Second) of
the Conflict of Laws.231 Constructive service, i.e., anything less
than actual notice, is undesirable. It is something less than the
fair play that the Supreme Court talks about in recent decisions.
Perhaps in a rare case, like Mullane, where the addresses of de-
fendants are unknown, it is defensible, but even in these cases that
is doubtful. Where a choice must be made between expediency
and due process, due process should prevail.
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., RESTATmENT OF JuDG~mrrs § 6, comment c (1942).
231 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75,
comment d (1956).
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